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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Idaho Code § 41-1042 Does Not Limit a Bail Agent's Ability to Recover 
Apprehension Costs Pursuant to an Indemnity Agreement Entered During the 
Bail Transaction 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 limits the charges for a bail agent's service in the bail transaction 
and does not apply to the remedies available to the parties in the event of a breach of the bail 
bond agreement. The DOl's contrary interpretation of the statute fails to give effect to its plain 
language and is unreasonable. This Court should therefore reverse the DOl's Final Order on 
Two Jinn' s request for declaratory ruling. 
Throughout the proceedings before the DOl and district court, Aladdin noted that the 
DOl's interpretation of Section 41-1042 is illogical and internally inconsistent because it permits 
bail agents to contract for one remedy in the event of breach - the agreement to pay the forfeiture 
- but not contract for another remedy in the event of breach - the agreement to pay apprehension 
costs, when neither remedy is enumerated in Section 41-1042. In its brief to this Court, the DOl 
again neglects to explain why an agreement to reimburse for apprehension costs is precluded as 
non enumerated "valuable consideration" in exchange for the bail agent's service in the bail 
transaction yet an agreement to reimburse the amount of forfeiture - also non enumerated - is not 
precluded. The Dor instead responds - as it did in the district court - to arguments which 
Aladdin has not made, such as that the Third Paragraph is not part of the bail transaction and that 
it is a promissory note. 
In short, Idaho Code § 41-1042' s plain language does not reach the remedies to which the 
parties may contract in the event of a breach of the bail bond. Even if the statutory language 
were ambiguous, legislative history and public policy confirm a legislative intent to allow bail 
agents to contract for the recovery of contingent losses, including apprehension expenses, at the 
time of the bail transaction. Accordingly, this Court should exercise its ultimate responsibility to 
construe legislative language and declare that Section 41-1042 does not preclude indemnity 
agreements concerning recovery of apprehension costs such as Paragraph Three of the agreement 
utilized by Aladdin. 
1. Idaho Code § 41-1042's plain language does not preclude recovery of the 
breach remedy reflected in Aladdin's indemnity agreement 
Section 41-1042 limits the reimbursement a bail agent may seek for services and 
expenses in connection with the bail transaction. The Third Paragraph of the Indemnity 
Agreement does not describe charges for such services and expenses. Instead, the Third 
Paragraph obligates the indemnitor (the criminal defcndant and/or a third party guarantor) to 
agree to reimburse expenses that might be incurred at a latcr date in the event the criminal 
defendant breaches the bail bond agreement by failing to appear in court and it becomes 
necessary to apprehend and return the defendant to custody. Section 41-1042 has no application 
to this agreement to pay contingent recovery expenses in the event of a breach. 
In arguing to the contrary, the DOl contends a bail agent can accept nothing of value in 
any bail transaction unless it is listed in Section 41-1042. Respondent's Brief, p. 5. The DOr 
then notes that the Third Paragraph is something of value accepted in the bail transaction and 
Section 41-1042 must necessarily prohibit Aladdin from obtaining that agreement at the time the 
bail is posted. ld. at p. 6. 
Contrary to the DOl's assertion, Section 41-1042 does not apply to any "valuable 
consideration" that a bail agent might obtain during the bail transaction and instead plainly limits 
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"charges for [the bail agent's] service in a bail transaction." Idaho Code § 41-1042(2) (emphasis 
added). Contractual remedies concerning Aladdin's recourse in the event of a breach of contract 
are not valuable consideration charged for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. 
Aladdin has repeatedly noted the inconsistency of the DOl's position that the statute's 
plain terms do not apply to one unenumerated breach remedy - the agreement to reimburse the 
bail agent for the forfeiture - yet preclude a different unenumerated breach remedy - the 
agreement to reimburse for apprehension expenses. See A.R. p. 7 (noting that it is nonsensical to 
interpret I.C. § 41-1042 as permitting bail agents to contract through an indemnity agreement for 
the recovery of a forfeited bond but forbidding bail agents from contracting through an indemnity 
agreement for the recovery of apprehension costs, particularly when the statute is silent as to the 
types of contingent losses to which collateral may be applied); A.R. p. 60 (noting that the DOl 
"does not explain why bail agents can require consumers to agree to be responsible for the 
forfeited bond but not require the same agreement concerning reimbursement for expenses 
incurred in efforts to apprehend a principal that has absconded in order to have a forfeiture set 
aside and the bond exonerated"); A.R. p. 97 ("the statutory language does not support the 
conclusion that bail agents may require an indemnitor to pay the bail bond in the event of breach 
but may not require an indemnitor to pay investigative costs expended in order to have the 
forfeiture of the bail bond set aside, particularly where neither expense is an enumerated charge 
in Section 41-1042"); C.R. p. 19 (noting that the DOl's "interpretation is internally inconsistent 
as neither the promise to pay the bail bond in the event of forfeiture nor the promise to pay 
investigative costs is enumerated in Section 41-1042 as an allowable charge"); C.R. p. 49 (same); 
C.R. p. 68 (same); c.R. 116 (noting the DOl again failed to explain how a promise to pay 
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apprehension costs in the event of a breach constitutes "valuable consideration" prohibited by the 
statute while the promise to pay the face amount of the bond in the event of breach does not). 
In its current brief, the DOl again fails to explain how Section 41-1042 can be read to 
limit some but not all breach remedies in its Respondent's Brief to this Court. Instead, the DOl 
responds to an argument Aladdin has not made, contending "Aladdin argues that the Third 
Paragraph is not a part of the 'bail transaction.' See, Appellant's Opening Brief at 7." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. In the cited portion of Aladdin's brief, Aladdin explained that the 
Third Paragraph is not a charge for the bail agent's service in the bail transaction. It did not-
and has not - argued that Paragraph Three is not part of the bail transaction. 
Indeed, Aladdin previously replied to this same contention in its reply to the DOl's brief 
in the district court: 
The Respondent's Brief is largely devoted to its argument that the 
Indemnity Agreement is part of the bail transaction. This is irrelevant. Many 
agreements are part of the bail transaction yet not enumerated in Section 41-1042. 
Section 41-1042 only applies to agreements that set forth a "charge" or "money or 
other valuable consideration" for the bail agent's "service in a bail transaction." 
The Indemnity Agreement neither constitutes valuable consideration for the bail 
agent's service in the bail transaction nor describes charges for that service. As 
such, Section 41-1042 does not apply to the Indemnity Agreement and the DOl 
erred in concluding otherwise. 
The Respondent broadly defines "valuable consideration" and then urges 
that because the agreement to reimburse apprehension costs fits that definition and 
is not enumerated, it is precluded. Respondent's Brief pg. 7. However, bail 
agents require the defendant to agree to any number of conditions that fit this 
sweeping definition of valuable consideration, including the agreement to appear 
in court, to be monitored, to submit to supervised bail, to provide a third party 
guarantor and to reimburse the bail agent or surety for the amount of any 
forfeiture. 
C.R.p.llS. 
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The agreement to pay the face amount of the bond, to appear in court, and to participate 
in supervised bail are bargained for contractual terms by the promisee given in exchange for 
Aladdin's agreement to post the bond to secure the defendant's release. In other words, these 
terms are no less "valuable consideration" as defined by the DOl than the agreement to reimburse 
apprehension costs. See Respondent's Brief, p. 11-12. And none of these terms is enumerated as 
an allowable "charge" pursuant to Section 41-1042. These terms are not precluded by that 
section, however, because although "valuable consideration" negotiated during the bail 
transaction, such terms are not valuable consideration charged for the bail agent's service in the 
bail transaction. 
The DOl does not dispute the appropriateness of a bail agent requiring such consideration 
as a condition of the bail bond even though none of the foregoing are specifically enumerated in 
the statute. Terms of the bail bond agreement, including a promise to pay the forfeited amount of 
the bond and a promise to pay apprehension expenses, do not constitute a "charge" or attempt to 
"collect money or other valuable consideration" for the bail agent's service in the bail 
transaction. Section 41-1042 does not apply to indemnity agreements such as that set forth in 
Paragraph Three. 
2. Section 41-1042's collateral provision further demonstrates that the DOl's 
interpretation of this statute is unreasonable 
Idaho Code § 41-1042 permits bail agents to "collect money or other valuable 
consideration" to "provide collateral" to secure the bail bond, so long as the collateral is not 
excessive in relation to the face amoW1t of the bond. Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b); see also § § 
41-1038(2),41-1043. If Section 41-1042 precluded bail agents from contracting for remedies in 
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the event of breach, there would be no reason to collect collateral. Instead, by expressly 
permitting bail agents to take collateral from the consumer to protect against contingent losses, 
the statute contemplates that the parties will negotiate breach remedies during the bail 
transaction. 
The DOl asserts that collateral accepted in connection with the bail bond transaction is 
solely for reimbursement of penal amounts paid to the courts in the case of forfeiture of the bail 
bond. See IDAPA 18.0l.04.016.03. However, Idaho Code § 41-1042 does not limit the 
contracted losses to which a bail agent may apply collateral. As noted above, it is inconsistent to 
conclude that bail agents may accept some "valuable consideration" that is not enumerated in 
Section 41-1042 (such as the agreements to reimburse the forfeiture and to provide a third party 
indemnitor) but preclude agreements to reimburse apprehcnsion expenses incurred to avoid 
forfeiture or have the forfeiture set aside. 
To the extent that the contingent agreement describcd in the Third Paragraph is "valuable 
consideration" charged for the bail agent's service in a bail transaction, it must be construed as a 
form of collateral expressly permitted by Idaho Code § 41-1042(1 )(b). The DOl responds that 
the Third Paragraph cannot be construed as collateral because it is not property and is not given 
to secure the bail bond. Even if the Indemnity Agreement is not the type of property that is 
normally contemplated as collateral, it secures the validity of the defendant's promise to appear 
in court and, thus, more closely resembles a form of collatcral than a charge for the bail agent's 
service in the bail transaction 
In arguing that the Third Paragraph cannot be "collateral" because it is not "property of 
any kind," the DOl contends that Aladdin is implicitly contending that the Third Paragraph is a 
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form of promissory note. Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Again, the DOl argues against a position 
that Aladdin has not taken. In its brief to the district court, the 001 also argued that Aladdin had 
implicitly argued that the Third Paragraph is a "promissory note." In reply, Aladdin indicated 
that it "has not contended that the Indemnity Agreement is a promissory note and, indeed, has 
consistently described the agreement as the agreement to pay expenses only in the event of a 
contingency - the defendant's breach of his or her obligations." C.R. p. 118. It is perplexing that 
the 001 continues to assert Aladdin contends that Paragraph Three is a promissory note. 
Further, the Third Paragraph fits within the DOl's proffered definition of security - it 
provides Aladdin with "recourse" that "secures ... the performance of an obligation." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 15, citing In re: Wiersma, 283 B.R. at 305. The Indemnity Agreement is 
given to secure the bail bond and give validity to the defendant's promise to appear in court. 
Thus, the agreement more closely resembles a form of collateral than a charge for the bail agent's 
service in the bail transaction even if the agreement is not the type of property that is normally 
contemplated as collateral. Therefore, if the Third Paragraph is construed as "valuable 
consideration" charged for the bail agent's service in a bail transaction, then it must be 
considered a form of collateral. 
3. The Idaho Legislature would not have adopted a statute that thwarted the 
purpose of bail and created grave public safety issues 
a. permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the 
purpose of bail and public policy and the DOl's concern over protecting 
the bail consumer from unreasonable investigation costs is not compelling 
Agreements such as Paragraph Three further the public policy underlying bail bonds 
including the return of fugitives to custody. Thus, even if Section 41-1042 was ambiguous 
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giving rise to the need to construe legislative intent, such intent reinforces the conclusion that 
contingent remedies in the event of breach fall outside the statute's scope. 
The DOl responds that "in order to provide a uniform and consistent regulatory 
framework and to protect retail consumers, the Legislature enacted law which prohibits certain 
charges or collection of other valuable consideration in bail transactions except for certain 
permitted charges including premium, collateral, and certain actual expenses." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 17. However, the DOl's proffered interpretation of Section 41-1042 neither furthers 
legislative intent in enacting the statute nor protects the consumer. 
Initially, the legislative findings the DOl cites in its brief to this Court do not pertain to 
the statute at issue, which was enacted in 2003, and instead pertains to the legislature'S findings 
in enacting a different statute in 2010. Section 41-1042 was enacted along with a number of 
other sections to "address differences between insurance producers and bail agents including the 
collection and accounting of collateral, record keeping requirements, and allowable charges and 
fees." 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 104 (Statement of Purpose). The findings cited by the DOl 
were part of 20 1 0 statutory amendments which clarified the DOl's authority to license bail 
agents. Respondent's Brief, p. 16, citing 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws at 165. Section 41-1042 was 
not amended with this legislation. See 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 86. The legislative findings 
cited by the DOl do not support its contention that the legislature enacted Section 41-1042 "in 
order to provide a uniform and consistent regulatory framework and to protect retail consumers." 
Moreover, as noted in Aladdin's opening brief~ if bail agents could not recover 
investigation costs, yet could recover the amount of the forfeited bond (which it is undisputed 
that bail agents may do), bail agents would have no financial incentive to locate and return a 
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criminal defendant to court. Compromising public safety by permitting the criminal fugitive to 
remain free would be contrary to the bail bond's purpose of ensuring the defendant's appearance 
in court. 
The DOl does not directly respond to these points and instead broadly asserts that an 
agreement for recovery of apprehension costs as a condition of the bail transaction is contrary to 
the Legislature's expressed intent to protect consumers. Respondent's Brief, p. 19. To support 
its conclusion, the DOl notes that the terms of Paragraph Three do not provide a limitation of 
apprehension expenses except that no apprehension expenses are chargeable after the entry of 
Judgment. Id. at 20. 
That there is not express statutory limitation on a bail agent's ability to recover 
apprehension expenses does not evidence an intent by the legislature to preclude the recovery of 
such expenses. As previously noted, the record does not reflect any instances where a bail agent 
has attempted to collect unreasonable apprehension fees and, if a bail agent did pursue collection 
of unreasonable apprehension costs, the consumer would have a defense to payment of these 
costs. Appellant's Brief, p. 19, citing Saladino v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 39 A.D.2d 765 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1972) (holding $4,000 investigation fee was unreasonable as the principal was residing with 
his wife without any attempt at concealment and working at his regular employment). 
Additionally, the DOr agrees that bail agents can require an indemnitor to post collateral 
at the time of the bail transaction to secure the entire amount of the bail bond. The DOr has not 
explained how an additional promise secured or unsecured - to reimburse Aladdin for 
apprehension expenses incurred in returning an absconder to court and avoiding forfeiture 
exposes the defendant or his indemnitor to additional risk of injury. Rather, indemnity 
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agreements concerning apprehension expenses often protect the consumer by providing Aladdin 
and other bail agents with an incentive to re-capture the defendant and obtain exoneration of the 
bond, rather than simply letting the forfeiture stand and collecting the entire amount of the bond 
from the indemnitor or defendant. Moreover, consumers have a choicc in which bail agent to 
use. If a consumer elects to use Aladdin's services, Aladdin requires indemnitors to agree to be 
contractually liable for the apprehension expenses incurred in returning the defendant now a 
criminal fugitive - to custody. It cannot reasonably be argued that a consumer is harmed when 
he or she has made the voluntary determination to engage the services of Aladdin and agreed to 
indemnify Aladdin in the event the agreement is breached. 
b. the DOl's suggestion that apprehension cost be negotiated after the breach 
has occurred is unrealistic and harmful to the public and consumer 
Aladdin argued that the DOl's position that the bail agents should negotiate recovery of 
apprehension costs after the breach has occurred is unrealistic and harmful to the public and 
consumer. The DOl does not respond to this point but notes that in the "Hearing Officer's 
Findings, Conclusions, and Final Order on Request for Declaratory Ruling (A.R., pp. 109-123), 
she explains well the effect and public policy issues of entering into the indemnity agreement 
after the bail transaction has been completed." Respondent's Brief, p. 18. The cited portion of 
the record actually sets forth the DOl Director's findings, not those of the hearing officer. See 
A.R. 69-78 (Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Order).! 
! The Dor also mistakenly cites Aladdin's original request for declaratory ruling in its 
brief to this Court by indicating Aladdin asked the Dor to declare that Idaho Code § 41-1042 
does not preclude indemnity agreements at the time of the bail transaction which permit recovery 
of "actual expenses later incurred ir (sic) connection with the apprehension and surrender of a 
criminal defendant who has failed to appear as required in court." Respondent's Brief: p. 5 
(emphasis added). The original document actually reads "later incurred in connection" and the 
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Further, as Aladdin explained in its opening brief, negotiating breach remedies after the 
transaction is inherently problematic. Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. For instance, no bail agent is 
going to investigate an absconding defendant's whereabouts for the purpose of negotiating the 
recovery of already incurred investigative expenses with that defendant and no absconding 
defendant is going to agree to reimbursement of these expenses absent a prior agreement. It is 
unrealistic to expect that a bail agent and a third party indemnitor will sit down at the table again 
after the breach has occurred and work out the breach remedies including the apprehension costs 
the indemnitor will pay. A bail agent who can simply collect the face amount of the bond from 
that indemnitor is unlikely to undertake the time and expense of attempting to negotiate the 
recovery of apprehension expenses after a defendant has failed to appear. Under this scenario, 
the fugitive remains free to the detriment of the general public as well as the consumer/ 
indemnitor who otherwise may benefit financially by paying lower apprehension costs rather than 
the full penal sum of the bond. 
Thus, the DOl Director's finding that "the goals of encouraging recovery and ensuring 
the presence of the defendant at court hearings are preserved" by permitting a bail agent to seek 
to enter an agreement for recovery of the defendant after the bail transaction is unrealistic. See 
A.R. p. 118-19. Similarly, the DOl Director's finding that "mandating a separate agreement for 
apprehension costs with the bail transaction not conditioned upon its validity or existence 
protects an indemnitor from potentially unscrupulous and unfair practices of incurring 
apprehension costs that an indemnitor could argue were unnecessary or excessive" is 
DOl apparently bases its indication of"ir (sic)" on the fact that part of the "n" did not fully copy 
on the Agency Record prepared for this Court. 
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unreasonable. As noted above, the common law provides indemnitors with a defense to 
excessive apprehension expenses. Further, the DOl could easily address its concerns regarding 
excessive apprehension expenses by simply promulgating rules that clarified that such expenses 
cannot be excessive in relation to the face amount of the bond or requiring that contracts 
concerning such reimbursement include additional detail. 
Interpreting Section 41-1042 as precluding agreements for reimbursement of any 
apprehension expenses at the time of the bail transaction thwarts public policy by discouraging 
bail agents from recovering fugitives. This risk is not ameliorated by the unrealistic option of 
negotiating breach remedies after the bail transaction and such a drastic solution is unnecessary 
to protect consumers against reimbursement for excessive expenses. 
c. permitting the recovery of apprehension costs is consistent with the 
Legislative history ofIdaho Code § 41-1042, Idaho Supreme Court 
precedent, and the DOl's position regarding the recovery of apprehension 
costs is novel and unsupported by authority from other jurisdictions 
In its opening brief, Aladdin argued that Idaho Code § 41-1042's legislative history 
establishes that the Idaho Legislature did not intend to preclude indemnity agreements permitting 
the recovery of apprehension costs such as that contained in the Third Paragraph. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 22. Aladdin also noted that the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that bail agents may 
recover expenses pursuant to the terms of an indemnity agreement in l\1artin v. Lyons, 98 Idaho 
102,105,558 P.2d 1063,1066 (1977). Id. at 23. Aladdin cited authority from multiple 
jurisdictions that recognize bail agents' ability to contract for the reimbursement of reasonable 
apprehension expenses. Id. at 24-26. Aladdin noted that the DOl's position is novel and 
altogether inconsistent with the statutory, regulatory and case laws of other jurisdictions 
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throughout the United States. Id. 
The DOl does not respond to these arguments or ofler any authority demonstrating that 
such charges should be precluded. 
4. The DOl's promulgation of a new rule purporting to implement Section 41-
1042 does not change this Court's analysis 
The existence of the DOl's rule, which it promulgated while this action was pending to 
implement its interpretation of Section 41-1042, does not alter this Court's inquiry in this appeal. 
See also Appellant's Brief, p. 27-29. In its brief to this Court, the DOl cites the Idaho 
Administrative Procedure Act provisions concerning legislative review of rules and asserts that 
its rule "provides further interpretation and guidance on allowable bail agent charges and fees" 
that it regulates. Respondent's Brief, p. 21. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act provides that: 
The standing committees of the legislature may review temporary, pending and 
final rules which have been published in the bulletin or in the administrative code. 
If reviewed, the standing committee which reviewed the rules shall report to the 
membership of the body its findings and recommendations concerning its review 
of the rules. If ordered by the presiding officer, the report of the committee shall 
be printed in the journal. A concurrent resolution may be adoptcd approving the 
rule, or rejecting, amending or modifying the rule where it is dctermined that the 
rule violates the legislative intent of the statute under which the rule was made, or 
where it is determined that any rule previously promulgated and reviewed by the 
legislature shall be deemed to violate the legislative intent of the statute under 
which the rule was made. 
I.C. § 67-5291 (emphasis added). 
That a legislative committee may have reviewed the DOl's rule implementing its 
interpretation of the statute does not provide this Court further guidance regarding the propriety 
of that interpretation. Of course, subsequent action or inaction by a legislative committee is not 
13 
relevant to determining legislative intent at the time a statute was passed. See Gillihan v. Gump, 
140 Idaho 264, 268, 92 P.3d 514, 518 (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Gonzalez v. 
Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009) (post-enactment statements of legislators are not 
part of the record that are considered the contemporaneous "history" that is appropriate for cOUlis 
to consult). Further, the validity of a rule - like the validity of the DOl's interpretation of the 
statute in response to Aladdin's request for a declaratory judgment is subject to judicial review. 
See I.C. § 67-5278 (validity of rule can be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in 
the district court and such a declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner 
has requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question). It is this Court's 
responsibility to determine the validity of rules. Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583,21 
P.3d 903,905 (2001). 
The Rule promulgated by the DOl while the instant action was pending simply sets forth 
the DOl Director's interpretation of Section 41-1042 as described in the Final Order. Compare 
A.R. p. 120-22 (Final Order) with IDAPA 18.01.04.016. The DOl cannot strengthen its position 
in this litigation by memorializing its position in an administrative rule and then noting a 
legislative committee reviewed the rule and failed to alter it before it became effective. 
The DOl's new rule is only valid to the extent its interpretation of Section 41-1042, as 
reflected in its Final Order, is correct. Section 41-1042 does not limit indemnity agreements such 
as that set forth in Paragraph Three and this Court should therefore reverse the DOl's erroneous 
interpretation of Section 41-1042 irrespective 0 f the foregoing rule. This Court should exercise 
its ultimate responsibility to construe lcgislative language by dctermining that Section 41-1042 
does not limit indemnity agreements such as that described in Paragraph Three. 
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B. Substantial Rights of Aladdin Are Prejudiced By the DOl's Declaratory Ruling 
In its opening brief, Aladdin noted that the DOl's declaratory ruling specifically concerns 
the Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond utilized by Aladdin to transact business and 
forbids Aladdin from utilizing that agreement. Since Aladdin is financially harmed by this 
declaratory ruling, its substantial rights are prejudiced within the meaning ofIdaho Code § 67-
5279(4). The DOl has not disputed that Aladdin's substantial rights are effected by its Final 
Order. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments set forth in the Appellant's Brief, this Court 
should reverse the Final Order because the DOl's declaration that Idaho Code § 41-1042 
precludes Aladdin from entering into an indemnity agreement at the time of a bail transaction 
which permits collection of apprehension costs later incurred should a criminal defendant fail to 
appear as required is unreasonable and prejudices Aladdin's substantial rights. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of December, 2011. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
BYs~~ 
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